Which are the limits of the regulation of the law that states the legal classification of the regulatory infringement in Sanctioning Administrative Law?

Abstract

The analysis of the principle whereby a criminal conduct must be clearly defined by the law (“Tipicidad” principle), core to the law on Administrative Sanctions, gives rise to the difficulty of establishing one of its component elements, i.e. the sanctioning core. Indeed, this legal classification of the administrative infringement appears in both, the law itself and regulations, and in the latter, it serves as a supplement to the administrative infringement, the administrative sanction or to both. This is reinforced with the current context in which Administrative Law is immersed, which led to a substantial rise in regulations that directly impinges on this field of the law. This state of affairs originated the following question: Which are the limits of the regulation of the law that provides the legal classification of infringing conduct in the context of the law on Administrative Sanctions? The answer to this question requires the previous analysis of the following aspects: Should the sanctioning power be expressly stated in the legal rule or can it be deemed implied? If the latter assertion is accepted, does it admit supplementary regulation? If so, to what extent should that supplement be? May the supplementary regulation innovate regarding the legal classification or is it limited to regulating such aspects that the legal rule allows? This research aims to provide answers to these questions.