Corporeality, prolepsis and dignity. A non-speciesist study of human dignity and animal worth

Abstract

The distinction between the human body and the animal body is one of the interpretative key aspects of what distinguishes the human being from the rest of the living beings. In the early 1970s, the accusation of speciesism arose against those who proposed differential treatment of human beings, above other animal species. Speciesism would be a form of discrimination akin to racism or sexism, and therefore unfair. For some time now, the social influence of this current of thought has been continuously increasing, even changing the relationship with the animal world. However, this position violates human dignity in one way or another, at least in cases such as with the most vulnerable. This is why we will try to argue why the arguments of speciesism do not hold. The human person possesses a particular dignity, not for reasons of species, but because being treated in advance as a person, we respond with characteristics that demonstrate the ability to possess that moral status. This argument, taken from Timothy Chappell, is based on the proleptic treatment of the person. Based on this idea, we will attempt to respond to the specific arguments of anti-speciesism and demonstrate why the human person deserves a different moral treatment than other living beings.